Failure to let the Generals Command the Commands at War.

More on the General Failure to let the Generals Command the Commands at War.

Gordon S Fowkes, LTC USA (RET)

There is a substantive legal difference between service members in general and officers in particular and civil servants doing the same job, and further with contractors, even those former military personnel.  The military can be ordered into considerably more dangerous situations than civilians, and cab be tried for life for refusal or failure.  A civilian is fired for failure to perform, not imprisoned. 

The "blame" for failure of operations in OIF/OEF I do place on the contractors per se, but on the Pentagon from stripping the flag and field officers in command of maneuver troops effective command and control of their logistics.  The contractors are bound by the terms of their contracts, which were drawn up by a centralized "procurement" organization.  As such, these logistics elements cannot be prioritized or moved around by the same echelon of command that used be able to for mission requirements. 

 A Rand Study published in 2000 traces the evolution of the Army Division of the XXth Century and cautions against busting up the divisional structure before it was done on the Capture of Baghdad/

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1211.pdf

That which was sliced off the divisional Discom to form the modular support battalions of the modular brigade was done by dividing the assets equally between modular brigades, not driven by priority of fires and maneuvers. The new modular brigade (except Stryker) had two maneuver battalions instead of two to five as needed.  Two maneuver battalion is not flexible enough, and the commanders in the field had to cannibalize units and resort the assets to form additional maneuver teams.  Many field artillery battalions (fires) were re-tasked as infantry as were headquarters companies.  As of now (a decade later) the third battalion is being restored.

The original intent of the modular two-maneuver battalion modular brigade was to restore the number of O-6 (Colonel) command positions formerly in the Pentomic Infantry division of the Fifties which had five O-6 command positions for each of five "Battle Groups" which each had five rifle companies plus two for weapons, support and command.  Since there was no battalion in the mix, there was no O-5 command slot, and the only place a competent infantry Lt Col could get command time was in an Armored Division.  The Armored division did not have the Pentagonal curse. Thus Armored officers and a few lucky armored infantry officers had the requisite command time for promotion to colonel.

The Pentomic Division was replaced with the same organization as the Armored division which went on until Transformation surfaced.  The post-Vietnam task organization of combat divisions for missions removed one of the three divisional brigade command slots to put a National Guard Separate Brigade under divisional control on mobilization in place of one of the divisional brigades.  The cost the Regular Army one each O-6 command slot for each affected division.

This had to stop. The Capstone Program assigning Guard units a combat mission for existing contingencies was a clear and present danger to promotion opportunity and timing of the O-6 regular officer.  This was an integral part of planning for future missions before 9-11.

The Pentagon set about a deception plan on how they were going to restore the three lost O-6 command slots, and quietly re-tooled the Battle Group to have additional field grade staff and command slots (O-4 and O-5) by slicing up divisional combat support and combat service support assets to support the new modular brigades.  By reallocating the existing maneuver (IN/AR) battalions in pairs created five Modular Brigades restoring the three O6^ command positions.  And it reallocated combat support and combat service support staff and command positions to favor combat support officers.  This was a tactical force design intended for promotions.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/63-3/Ch9.htm

The end result of slicing up the DISCOM, COSCOM, TAACOM and other TOE logistics and support organization and replacing them with ad hoc contract aggregates also removed the justification for Flag Rank command positions of those and related TOE organizations.  There were no more Area Support Groups, Transportation Groups, MP brigades, Petroleum Groups et al which made up the support structure. 

Not only were the chain of staff and command structures torn asunder, but the experience of how to do that disappears from doctrine.  All of the workings of a Corps Support Command (COSCOM) etc had been undergoing command post exercises of entire corps which included forces from all services and components but those of allied forces as well. 

All of the tables of organization, tables for allocation of resources were contained in field manuals that have been used as updated by technology, circumstance that any officer, noncom or service person could slip into any organization, and know what to do.  Now it's company policy and contract provisions.

In ten years, the experience base will start to erode to the point that years will be needed to restore. 

The stated intent of Transformation was for light, fast and agile forces, what they got was a force with maneuver limited to an extent not seen in the field since the Spanish American War. Transformation was intended to make life simple for the Pentagon to move around, but which required an extraordinary force of troops to make work.

For that reason, I stand in awe of the professional competence of our troops that made an impossible task seem simple.  The forces I served with in Germany, Japan and Vietnam would have been stopped cold with the kind of Mickey Mouse Transformation served up by Pentagon.

This is what General Dempsey knows he has to fix, but the quagmire in the Pentagon is full of mines and obstacles placed to preserve and protect lifetime employment of the Permanent Party.

Law Breaker In Chief, a NY Times Article rebuttal

Lawbreaker in Chief, the article by Jed Rubenfeld, misses one point on the authority to operate outside the provisions of a law passed by Congress, and that is that the Constitution gives the President specified powers not granted to Congress, that of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and the power to conduct relations with foreign nations. In fact, in those areas, the decisions of the President have the force of law.

It is the same power that a police officer or military officer has in issuing orders. A military officer who orders his unit to defend or attack a piece of ground, that order has the force of law.

The extension of Commander in Chief powers past the point in which military forces are directed on the ground, sea, or in the air, is problematic as the Constitution gives the Congress the authority to determine what kind of military the President gets to command, including the organization, staffing, training, and doctrine that the forces are developed under. Of the eighteen specified powers of the Congress in Article 1, at least seven deal with military issues.

Since the creation of the Defense Department after WW2, the Congress has ceded it’s authority to the Defense Department in what used to be routinely performed by the Congress. The failure of US military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to have a post invasion plan is due to a major shift in the regulation (doctrine) and organization of the military called “Transformation”.

“Transformation” is predicated on what is best for the retention of military personnel, and not upon actually winning. “Transformation” is more concerned with fighting a war than winning it. Winning a war is not in the best interests of the Pentagon as ending the war would end the funding. And that includes the billions of acquisition costs intended for a war that is entirely imaginary.

Congress should focus on what their authority is in the military arena instead of wandering outside their Constitutional authority such as putting time lines on the commitment of troops. The meddling in Turkish affairs just recently is a equally unconstitutional and which has, as intended, a devastating impact on the conduct of both military and diplomatic relations in the Middle East.


The division of national authority specified in our Constitution is a part of the Anglo-American political tradition with the separation of those powers going back to the English Civil Wars. There, the King wanted to wage war on French Catholics with whom the traders of London were trading with. End result, a Parliamentary Army today knows as the British Army, and the beheading of the King. The meddling of the Continental Congress in military operations reinforced the notion that Congress should stay out of the conduct of military operations.


The sticky part of the wicket is that while the Congress has the exclusive power to declare war, the conduct of military operations against a hostile foe or in the enforcement of the Presidents conduct of relations with foreign relations does not need a declaration of war to open fire. A declaration of war is a legal state, that may or may not involve military forces. Battles may be fought without a declaration of war. The only safeguard, as with the British, is the funding which cannot include a restriction of Presidential powers, lest the funds be treated as unencumbered money free to be spent as the President chooses.

The Founders clearly understood that giving the President (or King) a large standing military force would tempt the usage thereof. The British system kept the Regular British Army small with large supplements of colonial troops, such as the Indian Army from which Dr. Watson retired.

The “well regulated militia” guaranteed in the Second Amendment is the default military force for the United States. These state forces, however, are restricted from having ships of war or standing military forces in time of peace. Likewise, the “regulations” (doctrine) of the state forces is that which the Congress directs. Here also the Congress has failed by leaving these decisions to the Defense Department without adequate review, such as having hearings on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which should be a Congressional task.

On an ominous note, the Army and Air Forces raised during the Cold War that used to be stationed overseas are being brought back to the Continental USA so that they can sally forth in ten days, win in thirty and rebound in another thirty. Given the failure of this approach, the Pentagon forges ahead with “Transformation” with a pig-headedness not seen since Sir Douglas Haig drenched the trenches of Flanders with British blood. One wonders in Rumsfeld’s New Model Army has a Pride’s Purge in mind. One wouldn’t like to see a “Rump Congress”

Why need Regulars when Blackwater is here?

Blackwater proves that we don’t need a large standing military to raise highly technical and specialized military forces in time of need from the general population. Their excesses prove that this shouldn’t be done by the private sector. Likewise, the logistical and service support needed for an eclectic military force provided by such firms and Halliburton proves the same point.

South Africa has made it illegal for South Africans to join private military companies in the aftermath of objections to Executive Solutions, featured in “Blood Diamond” were objected to by the rest of the African states. Executive Solutions proved that a highly trained force was more than cost effective, replacing ineffective UN and African peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone. Since reconciliation, large numbers of highly trained and combat experienced South Africans have been seeking employment in the guns for hire sector.

Historically privatized military forces on sea were either pirates or privateers, the latter being pirates with a government license. Privateers were banned by the Declaration of Paris in 1856 signed by all the major European powers, but which the US did not for lack of greater protection for what was left of US shipping after the devastations by the Confederate Navy. Half the US merchant marine reflagged itself to prevent capture by the Alabama and Shenandoah.

Field and siege artillery were private sector until the French in the late 17th Century made it a part of the regular military establishment. It seemed that the private artillery companies had a penchant for leaving the battlefield to preserve their capital investments against capture or destruction.

Logistics in the US Army used “sutlers”, private PX’s, up until after the Spanish American War. They tended to be gougers of troopers paychecks. While there are many private sector logistics operations that have provided the services that Army Reserve and Guard logistics units were tasked to perform, there has been widespread corruption and incompetence that has proved counter-productive in the war on terror. The building built by private contractors for the Iraqi Police Academy leaks shit from the light sockets. Shoddy construction and abandoned projects throughout Iraq leave a bad taste in the mouths of the people whose hearts and minds we bleed for.

The motives for the unprecedented use of the private sector on the battlefield stems two mutually reinforcing sources: Neo-Con religious fervor towards privatization and job security for the Regular Army. The latter fear that People From Outside the Box will threaten the job security and promotion opportunity and flowpoint if the Guard and Reserve forces trained for over a quarter of a century to provide combat service support and service support at levels from battalion to Theater Army would interfere the availability of command and field staff positions to budding field grades.

Few outside the military know that the structure of units above division (corps, field army, and theater army) were well trained and ready to go to support any kind of military operation. Fortunately for the US, the private sector has drawn from the experience and training of the Guard and Reserve in this capacity to provide the services needed. That is in addition to the ranks of the retired, and from those on active service who wish to double or triple their paycheck in the private sector.

There is a move in global politics and within the Bolshevik Left in the US to exploit the trigger happy reputation of Blackwater to emasculate GWOT. Rather than revert to the tried and true,however, the threat of Guard and Reserve parity with the Regular Army is enough for the Pentagon to now speak of withdrawing from Iraq to be able to be ready to fight an imaginary war instead of winning he real one in front of them.

The Turkey Turkey

The passage of the Congressional resolution condemning Turkey for the genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire over eighty years ago may well rank as one of the most unique victories of psychological operations by a nation’s legislature against it executive and its armed forces engaged in combat. With a “non-binding” resolution expressing an opinion in areas for which the Congress has no authority, the Pelosi “progressive” Democrats may have severed an important Line of Communication (LOC) to troops engaged in combat against a hostile foe. In ordinary military terms this is a move that would have taken at least a full corps of ground forces together with air power to match to accomplish the same thing.

This propaganda coup clearly aligns the Progressive Democrats with Al Qaeda, and the other factions of extremist Islamic terrorism presently waging war with the United States, and against all other nations who chose not to join a radical fundamentalist global Caliphate. Aide and comfort, anyone?

Given the simple fact that the philosophic position of the Progressive Democrat is presented as extreme liberalism which that of the Terrorist is extreme conservatism makes this alliance of opposites somewhat like the autocratic French King’s support of the American Revolution, a move which was decidedly regicidal in the end.

It might be said that President Bush’s intrusion into Congressional affairs triggered an equivalent response by the Congress, by the latter’s intrusion into matters concerning the direction of troops in combat and the direction of foreign policy which are reserved exclusively to the President under the Constitution. As such we are facing a serious Constitutional crisis which, if not nipped in the bud, may boil over into a civil war as it did in Great Britain in the English Civil Wars back in the mid 1600’s. Parliament against King.

Who are the Progressive Democrats, those who have allied themselves with the enemies of civilization, Western and otherwise? Aren’t they the same who claim they ended the War in Vietnam by pulling out US troops, leaving the Vietnamese to fight on alone for two more years? Aren’t they the ones that condone the Killing Fields of Cambodia? Aren’t they the ones who back Hugo Chavez in his near perfect emulation of a Soviet style takeover, the last of which occurred in South Vietnam?

Who are these Progressive Democrats who champion the suppression of expression and religion through the substitution of whim and caprice for admissible evidence under the Common Law? They and their over-Conservative counter-parts should pause and think of the ramifications of deviation from the Constitution and the Common Law if the tools of repression they devise gets into their opponents hands. Imagine using Guantanamo to house Christian Conservatives for preaching the overthrow of the US to establish a Kingdom of God on earth? Or for practicing ritual cannibalism in the Holy Eucharist?

It is time for Liberal Democrats to let the Progessives sink back into the sewers from which they came.

The Pentagon's Inner War

The Pentagon’s counter attack on COIN is well underway together with a full fledged assault on the Guard and Reserves. Both actions are “Rice Bowl” issues as both COIN doctrine and the clear proof that Guard and Reserve forces are full fledged combat forces and having the extra flexibility of adaptation to the chaos and confusion of war.


The Pentagon’s PSYOP plan for preparing the political battlefield includes the subtle placement of “articles” in the professional journals and in the press extolling the virtues of Transformation and undermining the credibility of those they oppose. The Navy’s termination of the Navy’s TAR program was preceded by articles denouncing the TAR. The attempt to strip the Air Guard of fighter aircraft was (and still is) preceded by claiming that Guard and Reserve pilots needed consolidated training away from home station, and it was cheaper. The Army’s combat service support structure has been largely replaced with civilian contractors who use Guard. Reserve, and Retiree personnel at multiples of their original military salaries, but do not compete with Regulars for promotion and command assignments.

From NGAUS come the alerts of further actions to emasculate the Guard and Reserves:


The Issue: Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB)Immediate/Urgent Action Required: Contact your members of Congress and urge them to oppose changes to the current structure of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) until hearings and debate in Congress can properly evaluate the way ahead.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) has served as the vital linkage between the senior leadership of the Reserve Components with the Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress of the United States.The current structure, when permitted to function within the DoD, as provided by previous legislative guidance of the Congress, permits face-to-face consideration and debate by senior Reserve Component officers and the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense, with appropriate reporting to the Congress.Current proposals to reduce or eliminate these Reserve Component leaders are counter-productive (Sec. 1623 in the Senate version; Sec. 531 in the House version). When permitted to work within its charter, the RFPB has stood the test of time and has provided a critical path on Reserve issues to our nation’s leaders

The Issue: Mixed Status ForcesImmediate/Urgent Action Required: Contact your members of Congress and urge them to reject Section 1621(b) contained in the House version of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The National Guard Association of the United States joins with the National Governor’s Association, the Department of Defense and the President in opposing Section 1621(b) of the House version of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, “Command and Control of Mixed Status Forces in Certain Missions.”This language directs the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures allowing U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to exercise command of National Guard forces which are not federalized but are under State control performing “full-time National Guard duty” in Title 32 status. The language refers to “mixed status forces” which are defined as National Guard units in Title 32 status which are training or operating alongside active duty units.A law purporting to allow state-controlled National Guard forces to be placed under the command of federal military officers would be in conflict with 32 USC 115, unless such law requires consent of the governor. There is no mention of governor’s consent in Sec. 1621(b)

The key issue that we have to decide is to accept or reject the idea that all military wisdom and competence extend as a natural extension of a Regular commission, and that those who are not Regular are inherently inferior, save as temporary labor, seasonal workers, or cannon fodder.

Additionally we should question to continued utility of a career obsessed structure whose concern for military glory aka career management outstrips their concern with defending the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The advance PR about the likelihood of COIN operations as a passing fad is based on the Pentagon’s assessment that the War in front of us interferes with the Pentagon’s imaginary war needed billions in fancy hardware. They would rather lose the War on Terror than face the reality that the current Defense Department is terminally dysfunctional in fighting real wars.

It is time to restore the ability of the nation to build a war winning military capability in the manner we did prior to the creation of the Defense Department. This Defense department has no concept of defense nor of war, and should be renamed the Military Department.

Gordon S Fowkes
Lt Col, US Army (Ret)

Surge to wipe out /COI?N

The Counter-Insurgency doctrine manhandled into position by the Combined Arms Center under the tutelage of LTG Petraeus and published as FM3-24 represents a clear and present danger to Transformation of the military from one capable to fighting anyone anywhere, for any reason into one focused on a notional figmentary enemy and terrain created to foster predictable career development patterns and to justify the spending of tens of billions in weapons and equipment solely needed for the notional battlefield.

The principle threat to the SuperGrade-Industrial Complex, formerly known as the Military-Industrial Complex until rotational assignment rotas ensured that the impact of the military assigned to be Pentagon is controllable by superior GS15 plus Supergrades which has effectively reduced the military in the Pentagon to Hand Puppers. Likewise, any political appointee can, like in other governments, can be danced around until they quit for frustration or get set up.


The proof that such a pageant exists is that the military assigned to the Pentagon normally serves for three years, not long enough to find out who does what, who produces and go obfuscate, and my the second year figures out what needs to be done and before the third implementing rule is finished, so is the policy which the next Colonel who comes in will get an MSM for reversing it.

Likewise it is impossible for any unstable force of milicrats to sustain a policy of anykind for more than three years and most of the policies associated under the lable :”Transformation” are remarkable in consistency over multiple administrations, something a rotational military/appointed civil service could sustain.

While there were serious conflict in the Pentagon over the conduct of the war between the role specified in FM3-24 calling for a multi-disciplined multi-level effort to mix economic, political, health, governance, and judicious use of massive firepower, has been sabotaged by the Surge, a rotational concept beloved by rotational career centric policies of Transformation.

Surges are temporary which sabotages the longpull approach of COIN operations. By associating Petraes name with the Pentagon Surge Policy dooms his effectives which the srurge recedes..

Likewise is the Pentagon;s insistence that the Army is over-extended, a condition created by the Pentagon by not pushing for Full Presidential Mobilization which would have kept the Guard and Reserve units on active duty until the emergency was over..

Centers of Gravity Aren't

In order to sound both appropriately pompous, erudite, and authoritative on things military, it is fashionable to use the term “Center of Gravity” to define that which the power of a belligerent emanates, and “around which” the opponent operates. This concept was described in pompous, erudite, and authoritative terms in the book “On War” by Karl Clauswitz published by his wife in the 1800’s after his death. Likewise, it has become quite the fad to quote Clausewitz in the same manner a fundamentalist religionist quotes Holy Scripture be it Bible, Koran, Torah, or Karl Marx.

Unfortunately for the military professional, that which constitutes the Center of Gravity (COG) isn’t all that obvious. It could be geographic, political, social, economic, technical, and/or personal at multiple levels of interest. Clausewitz’s concept itself shifts throughout his book being quite different at the end of the book than of the beginning. As such, military writings today are filled with differing notions of what it is. Or how many there are.

In order for the concept of a COG to be useful to a combatant, it should be consistently understood by his or her forces, but if it were that obvious to one side, it would be obvious to the other(s). Hard to be deceptive under those circumstances and Sun Tzu, the next most quoted authority, would send a pupil who used COG as a term to the blackboard to write “COG’s aren’t”, ten thousand times.

The very notion that one operates “around” a COG suggests a circular voyage as in staff coordination in the Pentagon. Quite useless in practice and the French would be aghast as it not only doesn’t work in practice (forgivable), it doesn’t even work in theory.

The notion that COGs exist in the RW (Real World) has lead to more tragedy than triumph. Clausewitz was fashionable during and before WW1 which induced combatants of both sides to attack each others strong points as at Verdun while the collapse of the Triple Entente came from inside and their rear as hunger, chaos, and Communism carried by troops from the Eastern Front defeated the Will of the People.

The Japanese perceived the COG as the US battle fleet, the defeat of which would bring the US to a negotiating table. That didn’t work out that way. Likewise, Osama Bin Ladin chose the World Trade Center (WTC) as the Center of Gravity of the Great Satan. Both events were somewhat counter-productive.

If one had the Sword of Damocles suspended by a single horse hair above one’s head, the Clausewitzean would deal with the sword, while students of B H Liddell Hart would step out of the way and cut the thread. Like Yin and Yang, and in Aikido, one uses the weakness against the strength.

COGs are too elusive a concept to be useful for field commanders to guide their actions which, instead should be based on proven concepts of military decision making taking into account the Factors of METT (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available), plus Time and Technology available. At the risk of my own pomposity, let me suggest METT-T2.
Likewise the analysis of capabilities, limitations, weaknesses and strengths should take into account that some factors are timeless, some a transitory, and some are illusionary. The closest of factors to consistency is the human will, and geography which we called COCOA in the Pentomic Era. Cover and Concealment, Observation, Critical Terrain, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach, all of which are used to be able to dominate or deny movement over five kinds of terrain: hills, holes, valleys, ridges, and passes by movement over the high ground, low ground, cross corridors, ridge running or through the pass.

Clausewitz posited that the Will to Resist is a function of the ability to resist, which in Napoleonic times seemed reasonable. But given the stubborn resistance of U-Boot crews, Viet Cong troops, and the Jihadi, it’s just as likely that the reverse is true. The ability to resist is a function of the will to resist, a sort of Triumph of the Will, so to speak.

Gordon S Fowkes